Comments on: Podcast #53: “Did My Neurons Make Me Do It?”

By: Greg Dardas

Greg Dardas — Sun, 24 May 2009 12:41:42 +0000

In thinking about this issue as I have for many years, it seems these discussions often go astray due as much as anything, to semantics.
To my way of thinking, “Free Will” implies that our mind/brain possesses supernatural transcendent power. For otherwise, our thoughts, our Free Will, would have to be considered in some ways, dependent upon the contingent conditions of the physical brain itself, and the sensory input and prior experiences contained therein.
A further stumbling block encountered when I discuss this issue with people is that some fall into the false dichotomy of believing that our thoughts/will are either “free” or determined (i.e. predictable).
The entire debate suffers perhaps most notably by until now anyway, an inability to develop test which could support or falsify hypotheses. Well known studies have shown that certain experimentally constructed decisions have been made several seconds before such decisions reach consciousness. Some interpret this as evidence that decisions are therefore not under our control (i.e. Free Will does not exist). Though I am definitely on the No Free Will side of the debate, all such studies demonstrate is that certain decisions are made “unconsciously”. Thus, all that has been achieved is to move the debate is at least one step from the realm of consciousness into some other part of the either omniscient or dependent brain. It does not identify the point of origin or nature (independent or dependent) of the decision itself.
Proponents of either side of the debate could argue that these observations still are consistent with their views.

By: Ginger Campbell, MD

Ginger Campbell, MD — Mon, 11 May 2009 17:10:18 +0000

Tom,

Your criticisms are very valid, and certainly highlight the disadvantage of trying to summarize such a complex topic in an hour podcast.

By: Tom Oliver

Tom Oliver — Mon, 04 May 2009 21:25:09 +0000

I enjoyed listening to the hour, but I must admit that your discussion, especially the discussion of ‘top-down causation’, left me unconvinced. Just by saying that ‘reductionism’ ignores emergent phenomena and environmental cues while dynamical-systems approaches to complex systems includes them merely suggests that the dynamical systems perspective does a better job of modelling the systems as they are, while the reductionist straw man you describe does a poor job indeed. That your/the authors’ limited model of ‘reductionism’ fails to account for the behavior of complex systems does not make these systems any less deterministic, nor imply that our perceived wishes or wills are any more or less likely to affect our physical or mental states. All it really says is that these systems are complex enough to defy understanding, and that simply ‘break-it-down’ reductionism doesn’t get the job done.
Also, I feel like the distinction you draw between reductionism and emergence/dynamical system is overstated. It’s not that complex systems are the “sum of their parts”, it’s just that how you “sum” the parts is just as important as the parts themselves.
Whether our intuition of free will is real or illusory is an issue I have yet to fully understand, and have not yet made up my mind. Even though I don’t agree with your conclusions, I’m open to the chance that I didn’t get your whole argument, and I appreciate your intelligent discussion.

Thanks for podcasting,

Tom Oliver